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In a now-classic study by Srull and Wyer (1979), people who were exposed to phrases with 
hostile content subsequently judged a man as being more hostile. And this “hostile 
priming effect” has had a significant influence on the field of social cognition over the 
subsequent decades. However, a recent multi-lab collaborative study (McCarthy et al., 
2018) that closely followed the methods described by Srull and Wyer (1979) found a 
hostile priming effect that was nearly zero, which casts doubt on whether these methods 
reliably produce an effect. To address some limitations with McCarthy et al. (2018), the 
current multi-site collaborative study included data collected from 29 labs. Each lab 
conducted a close replication (total N = 2,123) and a conceptual replication (total N = 
2,579) of Srull and Wyer’s methods. The hostile priming effect for both the close 
replication (d = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.22], z = 1.34, p = .16) and the conceptual replication 
(d = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.15], z = 1.15, p = .58) were not significantly different from zero 
and, if the true effects are non-zero, were smaller than what most labs could feasibly and 
routinely detect. Despite our best efforts to produce favorable conditions for the effect to 
emerge, we did not detect a hostile priming effect. We suggest that researchers should not 
invest more resources into trying to detect a hostile priming effect using methods like 
those described in Srull and Wyer (1979). 
In a now-classic study, Srull & Wyer (1979) demonstrat-
ed that exposing individuals to hostility-related stimuli 
caused them to subsequently judge a described individual 
as being more hostile.1 However, whereas the original study 
found a “hostile priming” effect of about 3 points on a 
0-10 scale, a recent Registered Replication Report (RRR; 
rmccarthy3@niu.edu a 
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McCarthy et al., 2018) closely replicated the methods of 
Srull & Wyer (1979) and found hostile priming effects of on-
ly 0.07 points on the same 0-10 scale. Further, only one of 
the 26 labs in that study found a significant hostile prim-
ing effect. Thus, the McCarthy et al. observed effects that 
were much smaller than the original findings, which should 
decrease our confidence that the methods used by Srull & 
Wyer would reliably produce a hostile priming effect that is 
routinely and affordably detectable by researchers. Howev-
er, despite the many positive aspects of their methods—e.g., 
having the methods vetted by an original author, pre-regis-
tered hypotheses, a large overall sample size, several inde-
pendent estimates of the effect, transparent research work-
flow, etc.—McCarthy et al. deviated from Srull & Wyer's 
original methods in a few ways. And, for some, these de-
viations cast doubt on whether McCarthy et al. provided a 
critical test of the hostile priming effect, which effectively 
would make their results uninformative about whether 
methods similar to Srull & Wyer's methods reliably produce 
a hostile priming effect. In addition to deviating from the 
original methods, there are other aspects of these previous-
ly-used methods that could be improved to create the con-
ditions that would presumably be favorable for observing a 
hostile priming effect. 
The current study focuses exclusively on the most well-
known outcome variable: Ratings of a described individual’s 
hostility. The current study addressed several potential 
shortcomings of McCarthy et al. (2018) and created condi-
tions that would be most favorable to detecting a hostile 
priming effect using methods similar to those originally re-
ported by Srull & Wyer (1979). Similar to McCarthy et al., 
the proposed study is a multi-site collaborative study. This 
proposed study contained both (a) close replications of Srull 
& Wyer (1979) that addresses the aspects of McCarthy et 
al.'s methods that departed from the original study and (b) 
conceptual replications where each contributing researcher 
developed and used stimuli that were unique to their indi-
vidual data collection site. 
Notable Deviation Between Srull & Wyer (1979) and 
the RRR 
The methods of McCarthy et al. (2018) deviated from 
those of Srull & Wyer (1979) in several ways. An exhaustive 
list of these known deviations is detailed in McCarthy et al. 
(2018), and most of these deviations are believed to be triv-
ial. For example, the ambiguously-hostile behaviors were 
changed to be gender neutral, one behavior was modified 
from “slamming down a phone” to “abruptly hanging up a 
phone,” and some of the stimuli had to be re-created. For 
the purposes of the current study, we will focus on the sin-
gle deviation that has been pointed out as the most po-
tentially consequential departure from the original meth-
ods: The setting in which the data were collected. In Srull 
& Wyer (1979), participants “were run in groups of four to 
eight” (p. 1663) in a laboratory setting. In contrast, the data 
collection for McCarthy et al. occurred in lecture-hall set-
tings in groups of at least 50 participants. In working with 
Dr. Wyer to develop the RRR methods, this was a depar-
ture that was specifically noted by him as being potential-
ly meaningful to detecting the effect. The decision around 
which setting to collect data in was ultimately made be-
cause another RRR (i.e., Verschuere et al., 2018) was run 
concurrently with McCarthy et al. and it was critical for this 
other RRR to collect data in a lecture hall. 
At the heart of this criticism is that the original Srull & 
Wyer (1979) study was run in a relatively distraction-free 
laboratory environment and McCarthy et al. (2018) was run 
in a relatively distracting lecture hall environment. The im-
plication is that running the study in a relatively distrac-
tion-free environment ought to provide a favorable setting 
in which the effect could emerge. As one reviewer noted, 
in addition to the “noisiness” of the environment, contexts 
have been considered a relevant factor in whether priming 
effects emerge (e.g., Cesario et al., 2010). 
Other Methodological Improvements 
In addition to addressing the notable departure from the 
original methods, we proposed addressing three other study 
characteristics that should result in improvements over the 
previously-used methods. First, in Srull & Wyer (1979) Ex-
periment 2 (but not their Experiment 1), participants were 
asked if they believed any of the tasks they had completed 
were related. They found that participants generally did not 
have awareness of the relationship between these tasks. 
This was a crude, group-level test of participants’ aware-
ness of the study’s hypotheses. Because participants’ 
awareness of the potential influence of the prime was not 
a part of the original study design (i.e., Srull & Wyer, 1979, 
Experiment 1), this was not assessed in McCarthy et al. 
(2018) even though lack of awareness between the prime 
and the effect of the prime is theoretically crucial for prim-
ing effects to emerge (e.g., Loersch & Payne, 2014). Second, 
when possible, the stimuli for Srull & Wyer (1979) were 
used in McCarthy et al. When not possible (e.g., the original 
priming stimuli were not available), new stimuli were devel-
oped that were believed to be consistent with the original 
stimuli. These newly-developed stimuli were created by the 
author in a series of pretests, vetted by Dr. Wyer prior to da-
ta collection, and then these same stimuli were used at each 
data collection site. 
Although using standard stimuli eliminates any lab-to-
lab variability due to the specific stimuli that were used, this 
approach also has a few possible drawbacks. First, the orig-
inal study was published nearly 40 years prior to McCarthy 
et al. (2018). Although a pretest ensured there were no obvi-
ous problems such as ceiling or floor effects in participants’ 
perceptions of the hostility of the vignettes, the passage of 
time could have affected the appropriateness of these origi-
In addition to judgments of a described individual’s hostility, Srull & Wyer (1979) also included two other outcome variables: Ratings of 
ambiguously-aggressive behaviors and ratings of the co-occurrence of traits. The current proposal focuses exclusively on the most well-
known outcome variable: Ratings of a described individual’s hostility. 
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nal stimuli in other unanticipated ways. 
Second, and similarly, the pretesting of the stimuli was 
done by one researcher at one location. And the assumption 
was that the characteristics of the pretested stimuli would 
be similar across all the independent data collection sites. 
Arguably, it would be more informative for each researcher 
to customize their stimuli for their locally-available partic-
ipant pool (e.g., Crandall & Sherman, 2016). 
Finally, neither the original study nor McCarthy et al. 
(2018) included “positive controls.” Because detecting a 
hostile priming effect rests on the assumption that several 
auxiliary hypotheses are true (e.g., participants paid suffi-
cient attention to the study materials, the data were record-
ed properly, etc.), detecting a highly-probable effect can 
help to ascertain the soundness of some of these auxiliary 
hypotheses (e.g., Meehl, 1967). The soundness of these aux-
iliary hypotheses are especially important for interpreting 
effects that fail to replicate a previously-reported study. 
Overview 
The current study was a multi-site collaborative study 
testing whether methods similar to those of Srull & Wyer 
(1979) reliably produced a hostile priming effect. Each data 
collection site used the same stimuli as McCarthy et al. 
(2018) and developed their own stimuli using a standard 
pretesting procedure. Contributing researchers then col-
lected a sample to obtain an estimate of the hostile priming 
effect using the same stimuli (i.e., close replication) and 
an estimate of the hostile priming effect using stimuli that 
were pretested specifically for their locally-available partic-
ipant pool (i.e., conceptual replication). Further, the pro-
posed methods included several characteristics to address 
shortcomings with previous studies. Specifically, the pro-
posed study (a) ran participants in a laboratory setting, (b) 
probed participants for their awareness of the study hy-
potheses, (c) included both a close replication and a concep-
tual replication of the hostile priming effect, and (d) includ-
ed several positive controls to help interpret the study re-
sults. Further, several steps ensured the data analyses were 
not influenced by the results obtained. Finally, because con-
tributing researchers conducted both a close replication and 
a conceptual replication, it is possible to assess whether 
some labs are able to produce stronger effects in general 
(i.e., labs that produce a strong effect in the close replica-
tion also produce a strong effect in the conceptual repli-
cation). Following in-principle acceptance on August 17, 
2018, the approved Stage 1 manuscript was registered at 
https://psyarxiv.com/gxp7u/. This registration was per-
formed prior to data collection and analysis. 
Methods 
Lab Recruitment 
Researchers who contributed to the current study were 
recruited in two ways. First, a call for the study was posted 
to StudySwap (https://osf.io/u6gfz/) on October 3, 2018. 
Second, the same call for the study was posted to the SPSP 
Open Forum on October 9th, 2018. After the calls were 
posted for four weeks, 31 labs had expressed interest in 
joining the current study. As per the In-Principle Accep-
tance, the names of the individual researchers who re-
sponded to the call were posted on the project’s OSF page to 
demonstrate sufficient interest to continue with the project 
(https://osf.io/7a6ur/); note that this list does not match the 
final author list because some researchers [e.g., research as-
sistants] were added after the research process began and 
some researchers who expressed interest to the initial call 
were unable to complete the study). Once we had a list 
of contributing labs, the lead author (RJM) provided in-
structions on how to proceed with stimuli pretesting, creat-
ing preregistration documents, and data collection (see the 
welcome email here: https://osf.io/6jyqv/). 
Individual Lab Procedures 
Pre-data collection activities 
Contributing labs completed four steps prior to begin-
ning data collection. For labs that used stimuli in a language 
other than English, the translations for each of these fol-
lowing steps were handled by the individual labs. 
First, each contributing lab obtained ethics approval 
from their local IRBs or arranged a joint IRB approval with 
the lead author’s institution. 
Second, contributing labs followed a predetermined pro-
cedure for creating stimuli for their conceptual replications. 
This process involved generating to-be-tested stimuli, col-
lecting data from a small sample of participants (i.e., N >= 
20) who were drawn from the same participant pool as the 
participants in the main study would be drawn from, and 
analyzing the data to select their stimuli. 
Briefly, contributing labs generated at least 50 3-word 
phrases that described potentially aggressive behaviors 
(e.g., “hit his face”) and at least 50 3-word phrases that de-
scribed non-aggressive behaviors (e.g., “wash the clothes”). 
Contributing labs also created at least two brief vignettes 
that described an individual who behaved in an ambiguous-
ly-aggressive manner. Participants in the pretesting sample 
rated the extent to which the 3-word phrases were aggres-
sive and rated the extent to which the individual described 
in the vignette was hostile. 
The 24 most aggressive 3-word phrases and the 30 least 
aggressive 3-word phrases were used for the priming stimuli 
in each lab’s conceptual replications. These selected phras-
es were then used to create the “hostile priming” stimuli 
where 24/30 described aggressive behaviors and the “con-
trol” stimuli where 0/30 described aggressive behaviors. 
Contributing labs also identified the vignette in which the 
described individual was viewed as moderately hostile and 
did not have any noticeable floor or ceiling effects. Con-
tributing labs also visually inspected a distribution of the 
hostility ratings to ensure the distributions did not have any 
floor or ceiling effects. In a small number of cases where the 
vignettes resulted in similar pretesting data (e.g., the mean 
hostility ratings were similar and the distribution of hos-
tility ratings were similar), researchers at these labs were 
instructed to use their expertise/experience to select a vi-
gnette they felt would provide a “fair test” of the hostile 
priming effect. 
Third, once labs completed their pretesting, their 
pretesting stimuli and data were uploaded to the projects’ 
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Open Science Framework page and their conceptual repli-
cation stimuli were created and uploaded to the project’s 
Open Science Framework page. A study was then created 
that was similar in appearance to the close replication 
study. 
Finally, labs pre-registered their analysis plan for their 
conceptual replication study. That is, they specified how 
they would quantify the outcome variable and how they 
would test the hostile priming hypothesis. Researchers were 
instructed to choose an outcome variable they felt provided 
a “fair test” of the hostile priming effect. 
Data collection procedures 
Each contributing lab collected a sample for both the 
close replication and the conceptual replication. Within 
each of these studies, participants were randomly assigned 
to either a hostile priming condition or a neutral control 
condition. 
Upon coming to the lab, each participant was greeted by 
a researcher and started at a computer. Participants first 
completed a 30-trial sentence descrambling task. In both 
the close replication and the conceptual replication, partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to one of the two priming 
conditions. In the “hostile priming” condition, participants 
descrambled 24/30 sentences that, when descrambled, 
formed hostile phrases and participants who were in the 
“neutral” condition descrambled 0/30 sentences that, when 
unscrambled, form hostile phrases2. 
All participants then immediately read a brief vignette 
describing an individual who behaved in an ambiguously 
hostile manner, and then rated that individual on the traits 
relevant to hostility (those in the close replication condi-
tion saw the same “Ronald vignette” and provided trait rat-
ings that were used in as used in Srull & Wyer [1979] and 
McCarthy et al. [2018], and those in the conceptual repli-
cation viewed a vignette and provided ratings on traits that 
were unique to each lab). 
Thus, participants were placed into either the hostile 
priming condition or the control conditions for the close 
replication study (which was the same procedure with the 
same stimuli at each contributing lab) or for the conceptual 
replication study (which was the same procedure, but with 
stimuli that were unique, for each contributing lab). 
All participants then viewed a screen that asked them to 
report the extent to which they agree with the statements 
“watching TV is a hobby of mine,” “playing video games is 
a hobby of mine,” and “reading books is a hobby of mine.” 
Participants then reported how many books they have read 
for pleasure in the past year. At the top of this screen, par-
ticipants read the following instructions: 
We are interested in whether participants actually take 
the time to read the directions. To demonstrate that 
you have read the directions, and are not mindlessly 
responding to items, please respond with “Completely 
Disagree” to the items “Watching TV is a hobby of 
mine” and “Playing video games is a hobby of mine.” 
Answer honestly to the items “Reading books is a hobby 
of mine” and "How many books have you read for plea-
sure in the past year? 
Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and 
height. After reporting their demographic information, par-
ticipants then answered a few questions to probe for 
whether they felt the priming task influenced their judg-
ments of the individuals described in the vignettes. These 
suspicion probes were modeled after the funneled debrief-
ing example that is included in Table 2 of Bargh & Char-
trand (2000). Also, prior to viewing each suspicion probe 
participants were reminded that “Your responses will not 
affect whether you get credit for completing the study or 
not. Please answer honestly.” Participants were first asked 
“What do you think the purpose of the study was?” and 
were given the opportunity to type their responses in a text 
box. Participants were next asked “Do you think any of the 
tasks in the study were related” and provided a “yes” or “no” 
response. Finally, participants were asked “To what extent 
do you feel like the ‘scrambled sentence task’ influenced 
your ratings of the described individual?” and provided a re-
sponse on a 7-point scale ranging from 1-Did not influence 
at all to 7-Influenced a lot. 
All participants were then thanked and debriefed. 
Sample Size Determination 
To our read, the hostile priming effect is a directional 
prediction and does not specify the smallest effect which 
would be considered supportive of any particular priming 
hypothesis. Thus, “feasibility considerations” (p. 359, Lak-
ens, 2017) were used to determine the smallest effects that 
researchers could affordably and routinely detect. Effects 
smaller than affordable and routinely-detectable effects 
would be considered too small to be of interest. 
We assumed that most individual researchers could reg-
ularly obtain a sample size of 2003. We also assumed that 
individual researchers would use a Type 1 error rate of 5% 
(i.e., α = .05), would interpret a one-tailed (i.e., directional) 
effect in the hypothesized direction as supportive of a hos-
tile priming effect, and would desire to have 80% power to 
detect their effect. These parameters imply that researchers 
would need a minimum effect size of d = 0.35 to be de-
tectable with 80% power in future studies of 200 partici-
pants. Thus, we used an effect of d = 0.35 to be the target 
(i.e., to-be-detected) effect. Notably, a review and meta-
analysis of this literature (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004) 
found an effect reflecting the impact of priming on judg-
In Srull & Wyer (1979) and in the RRR, the two priming conditions were 24/30 hostile sentences or 6/30 hostile sentences. Thus, having a 
control condition with 0/30 hostile sentences is a slight departure from the original methods, but is being proposed to maximize the like-
lihood of detecting a hostile priming effect and to create a more informative comparison condition. 
Note that in the current research that individual labs were asked to collect smaller samples because we were focused on the meta-analytic 
effect size estimates and not whether any individual lab could detect the effect. 
2 
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ments about social targets of d = 0.35, 95% CI [0.30, 0.41] 
(this effect size also was used in equivalence tests reported 
in the Results). 
We then conducted a power analysis to determine how 
many labs would be needed to detect an effect of d = 0.35 
given each lab would be able to contribute 30 participants 
per cell for each of the two meta-analyses (Quintana, 2017). 
If 12 individual labs contributed 30 participants per cell 
for each meta-analysis, there would be ~97% power for the 
meta-analysis to correctly detect an effect of d = 0.35. If 
more labs than 12 labs contributed to this project, or if labs 
collected more than the minimum sample of 30 participants 
per cell, the proposed meta-analyses would nearly always 
detect an effect of d = 0.35 (i.e., power approached 100%). 
To account for some labs not completing data collection, 
and to account for the exclusion of individual participants, 
we sought for at least 15 labs to collect a sample of at least 
60 participants (prior to data exclusions) in each of the close 
replication and conceptual replication. We surpassed this 
data collection goal, which means we had very high statisti-
cal power to detect an effect of d = 0.35 or we had sufficient 
statistical power to detect many smaller effects (d < 0.35) 
that would be considered theoretically meaningful. 
Additionally, the lead author (RJM) collected an online 
sample via Mechanical Turk that was planned to be at least 
200 participants for each of the direct replication and con-
ceptual replication. This additional sample obviously was 
not in a laboratory setting, but it allowed us to compare 
whether the effects obtained in an online sample are notice-
ably different. 
Known Deviations from the Approved Methods 
There are four notable deviations from what was pro-
posed in the IPA. 
First, due to an error in creating the study templates that 
were provided to some labs, we did not include all the traits 
for the outcome variable that we described in the In-Prin-
ciple Acceptance (a more detailed description of how this 
error came about can be found here: https://osf.io/z2g5x/). 
In consultation with the editor (see a copy of the email 
here: https://osf.io/7snj8/), we proposed using the average 
of the traits hostile, unfriendly, and dislikable (i.e., three 
relevant traits that were included in each lab’s close repli-
cation) as the outcome variable instead. Notably, this error 
only affects the traits used to compute the outcome variable 
for the close replication because individual labs could have 
chosen different traits for their conceptual replication. 
Second, the IPA was written with the idea that we would 
only include English-speaking labs to avoid the need to 
translate materials. However, we had several non-English-
speaking labs respond to the call for the study. In consulta-
tion with the editor, these non-English-speaking labs were 
invited to join the project. Because the current study met 
the sampling goals with English-speaking labs, the addition 
of non-English-speaking labs is considered a bonus to the 
initially-proposed study. 
Third, we had one lab complete the conceptual replica-
tion and not complete the close replication. 
Finally, we had 5 labs who did not complete a preregis-
tration prior to data collection. These latter two errors were 












aThis table contains the links for the information on which the meta-analyses are based. 
The stimuli and data for each individual lab can be found on the project’s Open Science 
Framework page: https://osf.io/j6uwa/ 
due to a miscommunication and were not discovered until 
after data collection was complete. 
Results 
Table 1 contains the links to the stimuli, data, and analy-
sis code for this project. We conducted all analyses using the 
metafor package version 2.4-0 in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). 
Data Preparation 
After data collection was complete, a researcher assis-
tant aggregated the individual datasets for the close repli-
cations and for the conceptual replications. The open-end-
ed questions for the suspicion probe (i.e., “what do you 
think the purpose of the study was?”) was coded for partici-
pants’ suspicion (examples of responses considered “suspi-
cious” or not can be found here: https://osf.io/nwzmt/) and 
then the dataset was “blinded” by the research assistant. 
The blinding process involved deleting the responses to the 
sentence descrambling task (because the content of those 
items would reveal which priming condition participants 
were in), deleting the responses to the open-ended suspi-
cion probe (because the content of those responses may re-
veal which condition a participant was in), and creating a 
non-descriptive “condition” variable with labels condition 
“A” and condition “B” (which corresponded to whether a 
participant was in the “hostile priming” condition or the 
“neutral condition”). This blinded dataset was then provid-
ed to two researchers to conduct the meta-analysis (i.e., 
Drs. John Sakaluk and Patrick Forscher) who were not in-
volved in collecting the data. These researchers indepen-
dently analyzed the data and their results were checked 
against one another. 
After analysis decisions were made and the data were 
analyzed, the dataset was “unblinded” and we revealed 
whether “condition A” and “condition B” referred to the 
“hostile priming condition” or the “neutral condition.” 
Effectively, this process ensured that the researchers who 
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and vice versa. And this process meant that the analyses 
were done by researchers who were merely testing whether 
“condition A” differed from “condition B,” which minimizes 
the possibility that any analysis decisions were made to fa-
vor or disfavor the to-be-tested hypotheses. Further, the 
two researchers who conducted the meta-analyses worked 
independently, which gives us further confidence in the 
analysis procedures and results are independently repro-
ducible. 
Pre-Specified Exclusions 
In all, 2,123 participants completed a close replication 
study and 2,579 participants completed a conceptual repli-
cation study. Participants were excluded from the primary 
analyses if (a) they did not complete all the sentence de-
scrambling trials, (b) they did not provide responses for all 
the trait ratings needed to compute the outcome variable 
(e.g., hostile, unfriendly, and dislikable for the close repli-
cations), (c) they failed one or more of the Instructional Ma-
nipulation Check items, or (d) they indicated suspicion that 
their trait ratings were affected by the priming task. Partic-
ipants could have failed more than one of these exclusion 
criteria. 
In the close replication, there were 1,402 participants 
(66.0%) who were not excluded from the primary analyses. 
Of these remaining participants, 413 were male and 979 
were female, three provided another response, and seven 
were missing sex information. The average age was 22.40 
years old (SD = 7.56). In the conceptual replication, there 
were 1,641 participants (63.6%) who were not excluded 
from the primary analyses. Of these, 481 were male and 
1,151 were female, four provided another response, and five 
were missing sex information. The average age was 23.00 
years old (SD = 8.79). 
One potential issue was that we had different rates of 
exclusions across our conditions.4 Specifically, in the close 
replication, 38% of participants in the hostile priming con-
dition and 30% of participants in the neutral priming con-
dition were excluded, Χ2 (1) = 15.43, p < .001. Likewise, in 
the conceptual replication, 37% of participants in the hos-
tile priming condition and 29% of participants in the neu-
tral priming condition were excluded, Χ2 (1) = 19.13, p < 
.001. The frequency of exclusions for each individual exclu-
sion criterion by condition can be found here: https://osf.io/
q2ngk/. For both the close replication study and the con-
ceptual replication study, participants were more likely to 
be excluded for not completing the priming task, not com-
pleting the ratings, or for being flagged as suspicious if they 
were in the hostile priming condition. For both the close 
replication study and the conceptual replication study, 
there were no differences in rates of exclusions for failing 
the Instructional Manipulation Check. 
Analysis of Positive Controls 
Two positive controls were included to ensure the meth-
ods produced highly-probable effects. 
First, a meta-analysis was conducted on the correlation 
between participants’ self-reported agreement with the 
statement “reading books is a hobby of mine” and their self-
reported number of books they have read for pleasure in the 
past year. Within the close replication samples, the meta-
analytic effect size for the association between these two 
items was r = .59, 95% CI [.55, .62], z = 32.70, p < .001. With-
in the conceptual replication samples, the meta-analytic ef-
fect size for the association between these two items was r = 
.60, 95% CI [.56, .64], z = 32.17, p < .001. 
Second, a meta-analysis was conducted of the mean dif-
ference between men’s self-reported height and women’s 
self-reported height. Within the close replication samples, 
males were, on average, 8.17 cm taller than women, d = 
-1.61, 95% CI [-1.87, -1.34], z = 11.80, p < .001. Within 
the conceptual replication samples, males were, on average, 
8.33 cm taller than women, d = -1.45, 95% CI [-1.62, -1.28], 
z = 16.49, p < .001. 
Thus, effects from both positive controls clearly emerged 
within both the close replications and conceptual replica-
tions. 
Planned Meta-Analyses 
Meta-analysis of close replication attempts 
The effects from the close replication attempts were an-
alyzed in a random-effects meta-analysis using the REML 
estimator. Among participants who were not excluded, the 
meta-analytic mean difference was 0.17 points on a 1 to 11 
scale, which is a standardized effect size of 0.09 standard 
deviations, d = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.22], z = 1.41, p = .16 
(see Table 2). The heterogeneity of this effect across labs 
was no bigger than what would be expected due to sampling 
error alone, τ = 0.19; Q(df = 27) = 39.36, p = .06. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, this effect size is small and not significant-
ly different from zero. 
We planned the study to detect an effect of d = 0.35 be-
cause that was determined to be a feasibly-detectable ef-
fect. The planned equivalence test confirmed that our ob-
served effect is significantly smaller than d = 0.35, z = -3.91, 
p < .001. This finding suggests that if the true effect is in-
deed non-zero, it is nevertheless too small to be routinely 
detected by the typical psychology lab.5 
Meta-analysis of conceptual replication attempts 
The effects from the conceptual replications were ana-
lyzed in a random-effects meta-analysis using the REML es-
timator. Among participants who were not excluded, the 
We thank a reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention during the Stage 2 review. 
One of the analysts also conducted an equivalence test using d = 0.15 as a target effect size. When using this smaller effect, the observed 
effect size for the close replication is not significantly smaller than d = 0.15, z = -0.86, p = .19. And the observed effect size for the concep-
tual replication was significantly smaller than d = 0.15, z = -1.86, p = .03. 
4 
5 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for close replication studiesa 









n M SD n M SD 
Aczel 58 47 19 8.12 1.84 28 7.08 1.84 
Al-Kire 26 17 9 8.11 1.52 8 8.54 1.14 
Aveyard 97 65 34 7.21 1.68 31 6.54 2.44 
Baumert 70 42 21 9.17 1.48 21 8.22 1.42 
Edlund 46 33 17 7.76 2.11 16 8.90 1.33 
ElBassiouny 63 37 17 8.22 1.17 20 8.67 1.33 
Evans 69 39 17 8.24 1.96 22 8.08 1.96 
Ewell - - - - - - - 
Fuglestad 81 45 19 7.96 1.60 26 7.87 2.22 
Hawk 67 48 22 8.36 1.24 26 7.78 1.88 
Hermann 90 64 29 7.63 1.69 35 7.89 1.31 
Hines 59 45 24 8.28 2.05 21 8.86 1.65 
Joy-Gaba 64 42 18 8.57 2.17 24 8.33 2.01 
Kačmár 93 69 34 7.73 1.86 35 6.91 2.07 
Kezer 84 57 25 7.48 2.15 32 6.76 2.08 
Lair 78 55 27 8.83 1.21 28 7.49 2.10 
Légal 114 68 36 7.72 1.56 32 8.07 1.46 
Leighton 37 19 10 7.70 1.98 9 8.48 1.89 
Magee 66 37 17 8.71 1.50 20 7.85 1.88 
McCarthy-In-
person 
110 62 32 8.27 1.77 30 7.77 1.92 
McCarthy-Online 212 152 66 7.47 1.95 86 7.36 2.04 
Norman 68 49 23 7.87 2.19 26 8.49 1.67 
Olsen 76 49 22 8.36 1.97 27 8.63 1.50 
Oyler 64 44 24 8.74 1.71 20 8.65 1.96 
Ribeiro 62 36 17 8.53 1.07 19 8.95 1.08 
Schütz 74 45 19 8.98 1.74 26 7.50 1.95 
Willis 64 47 21 8.46 1.77 26 8.09 2.27 
Young 66 42 18 8.13 2.39 24 8.43 1.14 
Zogmaister 65 47 23 7.59 2.30 24 7.83 2.40 
aThis table contains the descriptive statistics for the close replication studies. These descriptive statistics are for the participants who were not omitted (i.e., they completed all trials 
of the priming task, provided ratings on all outcome variables, passed the attention checks, and did not display suspicion of the study hypotheses). 
meta-analytic standardized mean difference was 0.06 stan-
dard deviations, d = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.15], z = 1.15, p 
= .25 (see Table 3, individual labs could have used differ-
ent rating scales, so raw mean differences are not inter-
pretable). The heterogeneity of this effect across labs was 
no bigger than what would be expected due to sampling er-
ror alone, τ = 0; Q(df = 28) = 25.85, p = .58. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, this effect size also is small and not significantly 
different from zero. 
An equivalence test confirmed that our observed effect is 
significantly smaller than d = 0.35, z = -5.88, p < .001. This 
finding suggests that if the true effect is indeed non-zero, 
it is nevertheless too small to be routinely detected by the 
typical psychology lab. 
Comparing Close and Conceptual Replications 
Labs contributed data for both a close replication and 
conceptual replication. This gave us an opportunity to sys-
tematically compare the close and conceptual replications 
while controlling for lab characteristics. We examined the 
following questions: 
1. Did the close and conceptual replication effects differ 
in size? 
2. Did the close and conceptual replication effects differ 
in how variable they were? 
3. Did labs that produced large close replication effects 
also tend to produce large conceptual replication ef-
fects? 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for conceptual replication studiesa 





n M SD n M SD 
Aczel 63 57 27 6.96 2.56 30 6.56 2.75 
Al-Kire 179 123 61 7.31 1.66 62 7.38 1.57 
Aveyard 102 70 30 7.40 1.55 40 7.83 1.55 
Baumert 69 51 20 8.19 1.68 31 8.03 1.51 
Edlund 48 34 14 4.79 1.72 20 4.75 1.45 
ElBassiouny 57 27 11 8.88 1.91 16 8.23 1.97 
Evans 71 47 23 8.02 1.44 24 8.48 1.08 
Ewell 135 80 35 8.74 1.34 45 7.89 2.21 
Fuglestad 82 47 21 6.34 0.74 26 6.42 1.02 
Hawk 66 48 21 3.37 0.88 27 3.37 0.50 
Hermann 91 59 26 8.29 1.65 33 7.91 1.56 
Hines 58 44 23 8.17 1.29 21 8.25 1.23 
Joy-Gaba 70 51 25 5.78 1.77 26 5.26 1.43 
Kačmár 90 73 37 7.93 1.16 36 7.42 1.32 
Kezer 79 48 25 8.83 1.30 23 9.01 1.16 
Lair 71 40 18 10.11 2.11 22 11.32 3.01 
Légal 116 77 36 6.52 1.48 41 6.84 1.61 
Leighton 37 19 10 6.40 2.27 9 5.83 2.18 
Magee 71 39 21 7.62 2.27 18 8.44 2.45 
McCarthy-In-
person 
115 61 30 6.89 2.13 31 7.34 2.56 
McCarthy-Online 390 208 96 6.53 2.07 112 6.28 1.97 
Norman 65 45 21 8.72 1.71 24 9.03 1.45 
Olsen 77 50 23 7.70 1.74 27 7.07 2.40 
Oyler 60 41 18 7.11 1.97 23 7.04 2.01 
Ribeiro 65 43 24 8.48 1.14 19 8.66 1.02 
Schütz 65 35 17 6.82 2.24 18 5.33 2.09 
Willis 57 41 18 7.19 1.76 23 6.56 2.37 
Young 66 42 18 7.93 1.41 24 7.73 1.31 
Zogmaister 64 41 23 4.95 1.03 18 4.47 1.04 
aThis table contains the descriptive statistics for the conceptual replication studies. These descriptive statistics are for the participants who were not omitted (i.e., they completed all 
trials of the priming task, provided ratings on all outcome variables, passed the attention checks, and did not display suspicion of the study hypotheses). Labs selected unique outcome 
variables, which means that the absolute values of the means across labs should not be directly compared in this table. These data are presented so within-lab comparisons can be 
seen and so the meta-analysis can be reproduced. 
To answer these questions, we fit a multivariate meta-
analytic model with the close and conceptual replication ef-
fects as outcome variables, an indicator variable to track 
whether the effect came from a close or a conceptual repli-
cation, and by-lab random intercepts to account for the 
non-independence of these effects. This model also includ-
ed a fully unstructured between-studies variance-covari-
ance matrix. 
Close replication effects were no different in size from 
the conceptual replication effects, ddifference = -0.06, 95% CI 
= [-0.22, 0.11], z = -0.67, p = .51. A model that constrained 
the heterogeneities of the close and conceptual replications 
to be equal had no worse fit than a model without this con-
straint, χ2(1, k = 28) = 1.45, p = .23, suggesting that the 
conceptual replication effects were no more variable than 
the close replication effects (τclose = .18, τconceptual = .00). 
A model that constrained the covariance between the close 
and conceptual replication effects to zero had no worse fit 
than a model without this constraint, χ2(1, k = 28) = 0.00, 
p = .95, suggesting that the size of the close replication ef-
fects was not related to the size of the conceptual replica-
tion effects. 
There is a limit to what we can infer from the compar-
isons between the close and conceptual replications. On-
ly 28 labs contributed data for these analyses. While 28 is 
an impressive number for inferences that do not depend 
strongly on differences between labs, it is a small number 
for inferences that do depend on these differences. In par-
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Figure 1: Combined forest plot for close replication and conceptual replication meta-analyses 
This combined forest plot shows the effect sizes for both the close replications and conceptual replications and the meta-analytic effect size estimates. The vertical dashed 
lines represent our a priori smallest effect size of interest. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
ticular, drawing firm conclusions about whether labs pro-
duce hostile priming effects when they conduct close versus 
conceptual replications requires observing a large number 
of labs. The same is true of any inference about the relation-
ship between close and hostile priming effects. Thus, our 
results should not be taken as strong evidence about the re-
lationship between close and conceptual replications. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Exploring the Bayesian evidence for close and 
conceptual replications 
In addition to the preregistered meta-analyses, one of 
the analysts (Sakaluk) conducted a set of exploratory 
Bayesian meta-analytic t-tests (via the BayesFactor package 
version 0.9.2 for R, Morey & Rouder, 2018) of the sets of 
close and conceptual replication effects; the aim of these 
exploratory analyses was to provide greater insight into the 
strength of evidence for a null hostile priming effect. Given 
the exploratory nature of these analyses, the Bayesian syn-
thesis was conducted using a range of scales (“medium”, 
“wide”, and “ultrawide”) for the prior distribution, and the 
tests were effectively testing for the possibility of any hos-
tile priming effect (positive or negative), and the resulting 
Bayes factors were interpreted using the guidelines of Lee & 
Wagenmakers (2013). We then calculated 95% credibility in-
tervals by resampling from the posterior distribution of the 
model fit with a medium prior distribution scale. 
Analysis of the close replication effects yielded moderate 
evidence in favor of a null hostile priming effect, BF01 = 
3.02 - 5.92 (depending on prior scale), median posterior d = 
0.10, 95% CR: -0.004, 0.20. Analysis of the conceptual repli-
cation effects, meanwhile, yielded moderate-to-strong evi-
dence in favor of a null hostile priming effect, BF01 = 8.87 - 
17.59 (depending on prior scale), median posterior d = 0.06, 
95% CR: -0.04, 0.16. 
Exploring the effects of stimuli translation 
The original stimuli were created in English. Across labs, 
these stimuli were translated into seven other languages. 
The language of the stimuli was then entered as a possible 
moderator of the hostile priming effect. The language of the 
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stimuli did not significantly moderate the hostile priming 
effect for either the close replications, Q(df = 7) = 10.18, p = 
.18, or the conceptual replications, Q(df = 7) = 9.16, p = .24. 
Thus, the translation of materials did not seem to differen-
tially affect the hostile priming effect. 
Exploring the effects of participants’ “subjective 
influence of primes” 
Participants reported the extent to which they felt like 
“the ‘scrambled sentence task’ influenced your ratings of 
the described individual?” on a scale ranging from 1-Did 
not influence at all to 7-Influenced a lot. We estimated 
whether participants’ subjective influence of the primes 
(measured at the individual level) interacted with the prim-
ing condition. Participants’ ratings and the priming condi-
tion were both centered within lab prior to these analyses. 
For the close replications, participants’ ratings of the in-
fluence of the primes did not interact with the priming ef-
fect, estimate = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.04], z = -1.32, p = .19. 
For the conceptual replications, participants’ ratings of the 
influence of the primes also did not interact with the prim-
ing effect, estimate = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.02], z = -1.56, 
p = .12. Although weak and not significant, the direction of 
both findings is consistent with the idea that increases in 
the subjective influence of the primes is consistent with a 
weaker hostile priming effect. 
Robustness checks: The effect of exclusion criteria 
To robustly examine the extent to which exclusion cri-
teria affect the hostile priming effect, we explored 15 com-
binations of different ways of excluding participants. These 
results are shown in Table 4. No exclusion criterion, or com-
bination of exclusion criteria, resulted in a hostile priming 
effect for either the close replication or the conceptual 
replication. 
Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to test whether Srull-
and-Wyer-esque methods would reliably produce a hostile 
priming effect. In the end, despite our best efforts to create 
favorable conditions for the effect to emerge (i.e., high sta-
tistical power, customized stimuli for each local subject 
pool, attention checks, suspicion probes, a quiet lab en-
vironment, etc.), the observed hostile priming effects for 
both the close replications and conceptual replications were 
small in magnitude and not significantly different from ze-
ro. To put it bluntly, we did not detect a hostile priming ef-
fect in the current study. 
The current results then raise the questions: Why was 
the hostile priming effect not detected? And what might the 
lack of detected effect mean? 
Are There Obvious Methodological Reasons Why the 
Hostile Priming Effect Was Not Detected? 
In addition to following the general methodology of Srull 
& Wyer (1979), the current study’s methods addressed four 
factors that were considered limitations and, therefore, 
possible areas of contention, with the McCarthy et al. (2018) 
RRR. 
First, the McCarthy et al. (2018) RRR collected data in 
a lecture hall setting, which is arguably less than ideal for 
subtle priming manipulations. The implication of this cri-
tique is that a quieter and more controlled setting would 
be a better context for the hostile priming effect to emerge. 
However, even though the data in the current study were all 
collected in a quiet laboratory setting, the hostile priming 
effect did not emerge. 
Second, hostile priming effects presumably rely on par-
ticipants’ engagement with the priming stimuli and partic-
ipants’ lack of awareness of the influence of the primes. Al-
though these assumptions were not tested in Srull & Wyer 
(1979, Experiment 1) and, hence, not included in the Mc-
Carthy et al. (2018) RRR, the current study used both aware-
ness checks and suspicion probes to omit participants for 
whom the hostile priming effect would be less likely to oc-
cur. However, even though participants who failed an at-
tention check or who expressed suspicion of the hypotheses 
were omitted, the hostile priming effect did not emerge. 
Third, one assumption within close replications is that 
the stimuli operate similarly for each sample. That is, the 
close replications in the current study and in McCarthy et 
al. (2018) assumed that, for example, participants in 
DeKalb, IL, USA and Budapest, Hungary each interpreted 
the same vignette in the same way. Or, because the vignette 
in the close replication was from Srull & Wyer (1979), the 
recent close replications assume that participants today in-
terpreted the vignette similarly as participants in the orig-
inal study did about 40 years ago. Because the appropri-
ateness of the stimuli is an assumption, and therefore de-
batable, we had each lab complete both a close replication 
and a conceptual replication. These conceptual replications 
involved researchers creating stimuli specifically for their 
local subject pools and gave (some) flexibility to the re-
searchers to create methods they believed would produce 
hostile priming effects. If the stimuli or procedures in the 
close replications were inappropriate, for whatever reason, 
it should be more likely to detect a hostile priming effect 
within conceptual replications where the (presumably) bet-
ter-suited stimuli were used. However, the hostile priming 
effect within both the close replications and the conceptual 
replications did not emerge. Further, the results of the close 
replications and the conceptual replications were not statis-
tically different. 
Fourth, the current study also extended Srull & Wyer 
(1979) and McCarthy et al. (2018) by including positive con-
trols into the methods. Detecting a hostile priming effect 
relies on several factors such as properly following the pro-
cedures and selecting an outcome variable that captures the 
effect of the priming stimuli. Detecting a hostile priming 
effect also relies on fundamental, or background, factors 
such as the data being recorded properly, participants read-
ing and understanding the instructions, and responding co-
herently. “Unsuccessful” replications can be due to one or 
more of these background factors being absent. In the cur-
rent study, to ascertain whether some background factors 
were present, we included two highly-probable effects that 
we used as positive controls: A relationship between self-
reported enjoyment for reading books and the number of 
books read for pleasure, and the difference in height be-
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Table 4: Exploratory Analyses of Exclusion Criteriaa 
Exclusion criteria Close replications Conceptual replications 
d LL UL d LL UL 
No exclusions 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.07 -0.06 0.21 
Primes 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.06 -0.02 0.15 
Ratings 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.06 -0.02 0.14 
IMC 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.06 -0.03 0.15 
Suspicion 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.03 -0.05 0.12 
Primes + Ratings 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.07 -0.02 0.15 
Primes + IMC 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.07 -0.03 0.16 
Primes + Suspicion 0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.05 0.13 
Ratings + IMC 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.06 -0.03 0.15 
Ratings + Suspicion 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.04 -0.05 0.13 
IMC + Suspicion 0.09 -0.04 0.22 0.04 -0.05 0.14 
Primes + Ratings + IMC 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.07 -0.02 0.16 
Primes + Ratings + Suspicion 0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.14 
Primes + IMC + Suspicion 0.09 -0.04 0.22 0.05 -0.04 0.15 
Primes + IMC + Suspicion 0.09 -0.04 0.22 0.05 -0.05 0.14 
aThis table explores how different exclusion criteria affect the hostile priming effect. The “No exclusions” row represents the analyses when no participants are excluded. “Primes” in-
dicates whether a participant completed all the trials of the priming task. “Ratings” indicates whether a participant provided a rating for all the traits needed to compute the outcome 
variable. “IMC” indicates whether a participant passed the Instructional Manipulation Check. “Suspicion” indicates whether a participant expressed suspicion of the study hypotheses 
in their response to the open-ended question at the end of the study. 
tween males and females. These positive controls were cho-
sen because we were confident these effects would reliably 
be detected. Indeed, both positive controls were detected. 
Although detecting these positive controls seems mun-
dane, that is precisely why we included them. Further, mun-
dane and unsurprising does not mean unimportant. These 
positive controls demonstrate the soundness of certain (but 
not all) aspects of our procedures. A simple thought ex-
periment highlights the importance of these positive con-
trols: Imagine the criticisms that could be raised if these ef-
fects did not emerge. Now, criticisms of the current meth-
ods must explain why the hostile priming effect did not 
emerge and why the positive controls did emerge. Effective-
ly, the positive controls shift some of the possible blame for 
the lack of a detected hostile priming effect from these fun-
damental data collection factors onto the theory underlying 
the hostile priming effect. 
Finally, another notable feature of the methods is that 
both the current study and McCarthy et al. (2018) involved 
vetting of the methods prior to data collection. Several indi-
viduals outside of the research teams (including one of the 
original authors in McCarthy et al. [2018] and experts cho-
sen in the peer-review process of the current manuscript) 
approved of the methods and analysis plans prior to the da-
ta being collected. Although the current methods are not 
beyond critique, it is notable that the current methods were 
scrutinized and approved independently of the results ob-
tained. 
The current endeavor was not flawless though. We no-
tably observed different rates of exclusion among those in 
the hostile priming condition and those in the neutral con-
dition. These condition-dependent exclusions raise two 
possible issues. First, the analysts may have been able to in-
fer which condition would have higher rates of exclusions, 
which would effectively have “unblinded” the study during 
data analysis. To this point, we would reiterate that we had 
an approved analysis plan and two analysts who indepen-
dently produced identical results. Thus, even if the differ-
ent rates of exclusion made the data effectively unblind-
ed, we had other checks in place to minimize the effect of 
possible biases on our data analyses. Second, and perhaps 
more serious, is that condition-dependent exclusions might 
threaten the internal validity of our study (see Zhou & Fish-
bach, 2016). That is, even though the current study ran-
domly assigned participants to priming condition, because 
participants in the hostile priming condition were omitted 
more often than participants in the neutral condition, the 
final samples may have been systematically different. To 
this point, we tested several ways of excluding participants 
and no exclusion criterion or combination of criteria dra-
matically affected the conclusions. We also did not find dif-
ferences between the rates of exclusions for failing the In-
structional Manipulation Checks, which suggests, perhaps 
weakly, that non-excluded participants did not differ in 
their attentiveness or conscientiousness. Although we do 
not have data to more thoroughly test why this differential 
exclusion occurred, this finding highlights the need to test 
and report condition-level rates of exclusion in future hos-
tile priming studies. 
Collectively then, we believe the current methods are at 
least as sound as many previously-published priming stud-
ies, we had ample statistical power to detect effects that 
would be considered theoretically relevant, and the current 
meta-analyses do not suffer from study selection biases. 
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When taken together, the current results and the results 
of McCarthy et al. (2018) strongly suggest that Srull-and-
Wyer-esque methods do not reliably produce hostile prim-
ing effects that could be routinely and affordably detected 
by researchers. 
What Does the Lack of an Effect Mean? 
Does incidental exposure to hostile-related words affect 
subsequent perceptions of hostility? That is, does the “hos-
tile priming effect” exist? Although this is the question we 
want to answer, the question is imprecise because, despite 
how these things are sometimes discussed, there is not a 
hostile priming effect. Methodologically, there are many 
priming tasks that have been used, new priming tasks that 
could be developed and used, endless variations of stimuli, 
numerous procedural details, etc. that all could be put to-
gether into studies of a “hostile priming effect.” There are 
also several theoretical accounts of the cognitive process 
through which these priming effects operate. We do not 
claim that the current study can speak to all these method-
ological and theoretical variations. Indeed, no individual 
study can answer the more sweeping question of whether an 
abstractly described effect exists or not (see Yarkoni, 2019 
on difficulties of generalizing results and Molden, 2014 
about avoiding a monolithic view of “social priming” ef-
fects). With these caveats stated, we offer a few conclusions 
that are best thought of as falling on a continuum. 
On one end of the continuum lies a narrow-yet-confident 
perspective: The current results are highly informative for 
studies that are methodologically similar to Srull & Wyer 
(1979; e.g., the construct of interest is “hostility,” the prim-
ing method is the sentence descrambling task, and the out-
come variable is the rated impression of a described individ-
ual). For these methodologically similar studies, the current 
study is obviously relevant and we conclude there is serious 
doubt on whether those methods readily produce a hostile 
priming effect. Because we believe the methods of the cur-
rent study are sound, it is reasonable to doubt some of the 
theoretical reasons—such as how long these priming effects 
ought to last or the potency of these priming effects to have 
a measurable influence on the impression formed of a de-
scribed individual—for why these methods do not produce a 
hostile priming effect. 
As one moves towards the other end of the continuum, 
there is a broader-yet-less-confident perspective: The cur-
rent results are still informative for studies that differ 
methodologically, although with decreasing confidence as 
those methodological differences becomes greater. For ex-
ample, as the construct of interest changes from hostility 
to another trait, as the priming method changes from the 
sentence descrambling task to another priming method, as 
the outcome variable changes from rating a described indi-
vidual to another outcome, or some combination of these 
changes, it requires more assumptions to generalize from 
the current results to others. These mounting assumptions 
make loose links between the results of the current study 
and these other studies and, thus, these mounting assump-
tions could make the ultimate impact of the current results 
more of a glance than a wallop (e.g., see Fabrigar et al., 
2020). 
Nevertheless, we argue that the current study is still in-
formative, even for social priming studies whose methods 
do not have a great deal of overlap with the current study. 
For starters, the methods from Srull & Wyer (1979) have left 
an unavoidable impression on social-cognitive research in 
the decades since it was published. Indeed, literally dozens 
of published studies have been directly modeled after Srull 
& Wyer (1979), each with their own theoretical extension, 
but also built upon the assumption the to-be-explained em-
pirical effect is replicable. The implication from this line of 
research is that any activation of cognitive representations 
that occurred during the priming task had relatively long-
lasting and fairly potent effects (either because of residual 
activation or through another cognitive process that car-
ried the effect of this initial activation). But there is mount-
ing evidence that these to-be-explained empirical effects 
are not as replicable as once believed.6 Until studies regu-
larly produce priming effects with high methodological rig-
or and with enough specificity that independent labs can 
produce the effects (i.e., until there is a readily produced 
empirical phenomenon), it seems sensible to conclude that 
brief exposure to construct-relevant words will not have a 
measurable and predictable influence on a single-shot out-
come that is measured several seconds after the priming 
manipulation. Consequently, the empirical support for the-
ories explaining such effects might be weaker than was once 
thought. 
To be clear, we are not declaring all possible hostile 
priming effects to be unreplicable. Although speculative, if 
a hostile priming effect exists, and if that effect is due to 
the residual activation of cognitive information, it is likely 
to be an exceedingly fleeting effect that would not be po-
tent enough to have a detectable influence on a single-shot 
outcome measured immediately following the prime. That 
is, we believe a likely scenario for a hostile priming effect 
to emerge is when the priming stimuli would activate cog-
nitive information, which would decay rapidly. And to de-
tect this fleeting activation, it would likely take several tri-
als where a sensitive outcome would measure the effect of 
the prime immediately after the presentation of the prim-
ing stimuli (see Payne et al., 2016 as an example). Thus, it is 
conceivable that such a study could be done, and that study 
could claim to be examining a “hostile priming effect,” but 
the methods of this hypothetical study would look much 
different than the Srull-and-Wyer-esque methods. Such a 
hypothetical study also would be unlikely to have lasting 
implications for social judgement as Srull & Wyer suggest-
Indeed, see the recent replications of other priming studies such as “flag priming” (Klein et al., 2014), “elderly priming” (Doyen et al., 
2012), and “professor priming” (O’Donnell et al., 2018). Each of these studies replicated the methods for a longer-than-fleeting priming 
effect, each of these studies were not lacking for statistical power, and none detected the same effect as the original study. 
6 
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ed. For example, in their discussion, Srull & Wyer (1979) 
state that “although these effects decrease with the time in-
terval between their activation and the acquisition of infor-
mation to be interpreted or encoded, they are sometimes 
detectable even after 24 hours” (p. 1670). The current re-
sults would suggest this is highly unlikely. 
Conclusion 
The human mind, and the methods used to study the 
mind, are complex. And, a criticism of some replications is 
that merely repeating previously-used methods and expect-
ing the same effect is over-simplifying the matter (e.g., Ce-
sario, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). However, we also do 
not want to over-complicate a matter that is relatively sim-
ple. Namely, if a method repeatedly produces an effect, then 
researchers should increase their confidence in those meth-
ods; if a method does not repeatedly produce an effect, then 
confidence ought to decrease. The current study did not de-
tect a hostile priming effect, we now have little confidence 
that Srull-and-Wyer-esque methods produce a hostile prim-
ing effect, and we believe it would be unwise for researchers 
to place more resources into hostile priming effect studies 
using these methods. 
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